Default logic encounters some conceptual dif ficulties in representing common sense rea soning tasks. We argue that we should not try to formulate modular default rules that are presumed to work in all or most circum stances. We need to take into account the im portance of the context which is continuously evolving during the reasoning process. Se quential thresholding is a quantitative coun terpart of default logic which makes explicit the role context plays in the construction of a non-monotonic extension. We present a semantic characterization of generic non monotonic reasoning, as well as the instan tiations pertaining to default logic and se quential thresholding. This provides a link between the two mechanisms as well as a way to integrate the two that can be beneficial to both.
INTRODUCTION
Non-monotonic reasoning models the intuitive pro cess of making non-deductive inferences in the face of certain supportive but not conclusive evidence. Default logic [Reiter, 1980] is one of the most well known formalisms of non-monotonic reasoning. Al though default logic has many attractive features, it also encounters some conceptual difficulties in repre senting common sense reasoning tasks. In some cases, the most "intuitive" and direct formulation of a sce nario can lead to unexpected interactions and unin tended extensions, and we need to revise the formu lation to some less intuitive form in order to arrive at the intended results. A number of variants of de fault logic have been proposed to circumvent some of these difficulties encountered by Reiter's default logic, but they too in some cases produce counterintuitive results [Lukaszewicz, 1988; Brewka, 1991; Gelfand et al., 1991; Delgrande et al., 1994; Mikitiuk and Truszczynski, 1995] .
Most of these approaches downplay an important as pect: that each reasoning step is not done in isola tion. One implicit assumption of default logic and its variants seems to be that default reasoning can be characterized using simple rules that work equally well across all typical situations. A brute force method to deal with the unintuitive use of a default rule in some particular situation is to add a condition to the justi fication list to explicitly block the rule when that sit uation arises. This was first suggested in [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981] , where the use of semi-normal default rules instead of normal default rules was introduced.
We argue that we should not hope to write down de fault rules that are both simple and intuitive across many situations. A rule that appears to be intuitive and straightforward at first sight may have side effects and unintended applications in some circumstances. We need to take into account the context that is con tinuously evolving when we reason non-monotonically. After we have accepted a default conclusion, we take that conclusion as true, and it becomes part of the con text with respect to which we evaluate the remaining default rules. Thus the context consists of the state ments we take as true at the moment: the initial set of given "facts" F, plus the consequents of the default rules that have been applied up to this point.
Another way to handle the problem is to appeal to some external source of information not communicated in the default rules, such as using inheritance or prior ity hierarchies to prefer more specific or higher priority default rules [Touretzky, 1984; Harty et al., 1987] , and the utilization of probability theory for determining ac ceptable default rules [Pearl, 1989; Neufeld et al., 1990; Bacchus et al., 1993] . Our approach of sequential thresholding also makes use of probability, in a way closer to the spirit of non-monotonic reasoning and in particular default logic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec tion 2 outlines the distinction between non-monotonic reasoning and Bayesian based probabilistic reasoning.
Section 3 gives a brief summary of default logic, and discusses some of its conceptual difficulties and how they are related to the evolving context that is not ac cessible to the default logic mechanism. Section 4 in troduces a probabilistic non-monotonic reasoning for malism we call sequential thresholding, and Section 5 provides a semantic account of non-monotonic reason ing in general and default logic and sequential thresh olding in particular. Section 6 discusses how the two mechanisms can benefit from each other, and Section 7 concludes the discussion.
2
NON-MONOTONIC DEFAULTS,
MONOTONIC PROBABILITIES
As pointed out in [Kyburg, 1996] , there is a distinc tion between uncertain inferences and uncertain con clusions. In the former, the inference mechanism is uncertain, but the conclusions thus obtained are re garded as perfectly certain. There may be multiple extensions, each of which representing a possible sce nario, but within each extension there is no question about the "truth" of the inferred conclusions. We may need to retract such conclusions in the face of new in formation, hence the non-monotonicity. Default logic and many other logical formalisms such as autoepis temic logic [Moore, 1985] and circumscription [Mc Carthy, 1980] fall into this category.
On the other hand, most of the probabilistic com munity falls into the latter category. The rules of probability employed, such as Bayes' rule, are per fectly deductive, and it is the conclusions, of the form
Pr(x) = r, which convey the uncertainty. New in formation does not invalidate the previous probability calculations, since the original probability values are conditioned on a string of events without the new piece of information, while with the update, we are condi tioning on an additional piece of information. The two probability distributions are distinct as they are conditioned on distinct sets of events. Therefore such probability mechanisms are not non-monotonic.
An exception to this monotonic probabilistic trend is Kyburg's probabilistic acceptance [Kyburg, 1961] , which advocates accepting the conclusions fully when their probabilities are deemed high enough. The work described in this paper is along the same lines. We focus on default logic as a concrete example of non monotonic reasoning formalisms, and discuss how a link between default logic and probability can be ben eficial to both. Below let us briefly summarize the preliminary terminology of default logic.
3
DEFAULT LOGIC [Reiter, 1980] Let £ be a standard propositional language, and P be the finite set of propositional constants in £. [Reiter, 1980] [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981; Lukaszewicz, 1985; Poole, 1989] . The facts and default rules may inter act in unexpected ways, and result in no extension or unwanted multiple extensions.
We argue that this problem is to be expected in the default logic framework. Consider the following canon ical normal default theory.
and F = {a, a' } . There are two extensions, E1 == Th({a,a',b}), and E2 == Th({a,a',-.b}).
Which extension is better? Should we get rid of one, or should we keep both? Let us consider the following popular instantiations.
• a: bird, a ' :penguin, b: fly, we want only E2.
• a: bird, a' : animal, b : fly, we want only E1.
• a : quaker, a ' : republican, b : pacifist, then we want to treat E1 and E2 eq ually.
The three instantiations are propositionally identical. Given the same default theory, we cannot expect the mechanism to generate different results. It is quite obvious that we, the "intelligent beings", are in pos session of some contextual information that leads us to want to draw different conclusions in the different ex amples. However, this additional information, which underlies our "intuition" in choosing between the ex tensions, is not available to the default theory as it is formulated above. The theory is indifferent to whether a 1 is supposed to stand for penguin or animal. Nor does it know that penguins are animals ei ther. 0
This problem motivates semi-normal defaults [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981] , where an extra justification is used to denote "non-exceptions", so that the rule can only be applied when the object in question is not a known ex ception. For example, the default rules in the first case discussed above would be amended as f ollows. where the term -.penguin is added to the justification to prevent the rule from firing whe n the bird in ques tion is a penguin.
This amended rule works fine in this case, but there are many other exceptions to the "birds typically fly" rule. This leads to a qualification problem, where we need to have a l onger and longer (3 in the justification part in order to cover all "unintuitive" cases. This seem s to defeat the purpose of doing non-monotonic reasoning in the first place: we can as well explicitly list all ex ceptions, and revert to deductive inferences instead, which i s not desirable even if feasible. "Nam ing defaults" [Poole, 1987) also has a similar problem.
3.2

MISSING CONTEXT
We argue that this "intuition problem" arises because we are misled into thinking that we can formulate de fault rules that are modular. By that we mean the default rules are expected to "do the right thing" re gardless of what el se is present in the en vironment. For ex ample, the rule "birds typically fly" should fire when we only know that Tweet y is a bird, but the same rule should not fire when we know in addition that Tweet y is a penguin. The incorporation of exceptions into the justification is an attempt to en code some of this con textual information into the rule itself, but this makes the rules very cumbersome and difficult to formulate.
A much simpler approach is to take default rules as just one component of a non-monotonic reasoning system. We evaluate ea ch default rule with respect to a con textual element which is en coded in some way external to the rule i tself. An example of this approach is the use of inheritance and priority hierarchies [Touretzky, 1984; Horty et al., 1987] to determine the more spe cific or higher priority extension ( s ) . For example, from the inheritance hierarchy we know that penguins are a subclass of birds, and the more specific rule concerning penguins i s given priority over the more general rule concerning birds.
However, it is not always straightforward to establish a specificity hierarchy, especially when the classes con cerned do not have a strict set inclusion relation. For ex ample, consider a world in which not all penguins are birds, that is, penguins are typically birds, but there are some exceptions. It is then not obvious on what basis we can claim that penguins are more spe cific than birds.1
DYNAMICS OF THE CONTEXT
We pointed out that a default rule has to be evaluated relative to the context it is situated in. Now we also want to stress that this context is not a constant ev en if we only consider a single situation requiring default reasoning. Rather, the context is continuously ev olv ing during the course of the reasoning process, as we draw more and more default conclusions.
One property that is present in many non-monotonic reasoning systems is that we can build upon the non monotonic conclusions drawn ea rlier to draw yet more non-monotonic conclusions. I n default logic this cor responds to the chaining of default rules. Every time a default rule is applied, the consequent 'Y of that rule is added as part of the context available to the remain ing rules, and 'Y acquires virtually the same status as the statements in the original given set of facts F of the default theory in subsequent computations. The default consequent of one rule can act as the prerequi site of another rule, and the latter rule is dependent on the former to create the f avorable conditions for itself. Thus, even within one reasoning ep isode, the relevant context is not a static component; rather each default rule operates within a different context. One way to make this evolving context available to the reasoning machinery without explicitly and ex haustively listing all possibilities and conditions is to appeal to probability and the conditioning operation. Below we show a quantitative counterpart of default logic that retains its non-monotonic characteristic.
4
SEQUENTIAL THRESHOLDING
Now we present a probabilistic reasoning mechanism that is non-monotonic and very close in flavor to de fault logic. Sequential thresholding can be classified as a kind of probabilistic acceptance [Kyburg, 1961] . We accept a statement as true when its associated prob ability is high, say, above a certain threshold. The novelty here is that the thresholding is done sequen tially, that is, each statement is considered in turn, and all accepted statements participate in the conditioning of subsequent statements in determining whether they are above threshold.
The thresholding process can be thought of as a form of generalized conditioning. In regular conditioning, the conditional probability Pr(� I ¢) is computed when Pr( ¢) is assumed to have changed to 1. Thresholding imposes a weaker requirement: given a threshold pa rameter e, accept ¢if Pr(¢ ) 2:: 1-e, and adjust the posterior probabilities of all statements as if they are conditioned on ¢. 2
More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 4 A threshold collection C is an ordered pair (T, F), where T and F � £. We call T the thresh old set and F the fa ct set.
A filtered sequence 11 of C = (T, F) with respect to the sequential threshold parameter e is a sequence ( ¢1 , ... ,¢n), such that {1} V¢i in 11: ¢i E T and Pr(¢i I F U {¢1, ... ,<f>;-d) � 1-e, and {2] V¢ E T but not in 11, Pr(¢ I F U { ¢1, ... , ¢n}) < 1 -e.
Pr<l> ( 1/J), the threshold probability of� with respect to a filtered sequence 11 = {¢1, ... , ¢n) of C, is defined as
The filtered sequence 11 contains the formulas that we accept as true using the sequential thresholding pro cess. The threshold probability Pr<�> ( 1/J) is the probabil ity value of interest: the probability of 1j; conditioned on the facts F and all the formulas in the filtered se quence, which are the formulas we have decided to 2The t: in the threshold does not tend to 0 in the limit, as in .:-semantics [Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1989] , but is assumed to be some small quantity.
accept.
The formulas in the fact set F do not need to be above threshold to enter into the computation of the thresh old probability. The formulas in the threshold set T, however, have to pass a threshold test in order to be included in the filtered sequence 11.
The value compared in the threshold test is the prob ability of ¢; conditioned on the facts F and all the formulas that have been entered into the filtered se quence before (h This sequence is maximal, in the sense that no other formula in T that is not already in 11 can be appended to the end of the sequence in accordance to the threshold test.
Note that the effective probability space is shrinking. If Pr(¢l1 I F) is above threshold, we then only con sider the space in which F and ¢1 are true in sub sequent tests, and the probability distribution of in terest becomes Pr( * I F U { <f>t}), which becomes Pr( * I FU{ ¢1 , ¢ 2, ... <f>k}) as more formulas are admit ted into the filtered sequence. The probability value associated with a formula is technically unchanging: for example Pr( � I F U {<flo, ¢1}) is invariant through out. Rather it is the "context" in which to compute the target probability value of 1/J that is continuously evolving, as we build the filtered sequence.
Note also the sequential nature of how the thresh old test is administered. Since in general Pr(1/l I ¢o, . .. , ¢Jk) i-Pr( 'I/J lr/>o, ... , ¢lk1 ¢k+t), a formula that is below threshold at one point might become eligible for thresholding after we have taken a few other for mulas as true, and a formula that is above threshold at one point may not be so after we have thresholded some other formulas. In this sense, sequential thresh olding is non-monotonic; we commit to the truth of certain formulas when they become above threshold, and the probability distribution of interest is changed accordingly.
5
DRAWING A PARALLEL
In this section, we characterize a generic non monotonic reasoning mechanism in terms of the con text that evolves as the computation progresses. This generic process can be instantiated in various ways to characterize various specific reasoning formalisms, in particular, default logic and sequential thresholding, thus providing a link between the two.
Informally, a non-monotonic reasoning step can be de picted generically as follows.
1. Find a non-monotonic rule that is applicable in the current context.
2.
Apply the rule, and accept its non-monotonic con clusion as true.
3. Extend the context to reflect the addition of the newly inferred conclusion.
After one cycle we find another rule that is applicable in the extended context, apply this rule, and add its non-monotonic conclusion to the new context, and the process repeats ...
Both default logic and sequential thresholding conform to this characterization. For simplicity, in the case of default logic, we give the instantiation for normal de fault theories only. Non-normal default theories re quire some additional consideration, but the results basically hold for the general case as well [Teng, 1997] .
Normal default theories have essentially the same structure as sequential thresholding. This can best be shown semantically by looking at the possible world partition sequences [Teng, 1996] of the generic non monotonic reasoning mechanism described above, and of its instantiations for these two specific formalisms.
GENERIC NON-MONOTONIC PARTITION SEQUENCES
A possible world is characterized by a truth assignment to all propositions in the language, and a real number weight. Given an exhaustive set of possible worlds Partitionw(B, R) is not a function; there can be more than one partition sequence that can be constructed from the same initial parameters, such as when there are multiple extensions.
INSTANTIATIONS
Now we give the instantiations for normal default the ory and sequential thresholding respectively. We bor row the notation of modal logic: Da is taken to mean a is true in all worlds, O"f is taken to mean 1 is true in some world, both with respect to the reference context (W;, ... , W1} in the following.
Theorem 6 Given a normal default theory .6. = (D, F), a default partition sequence can be constructed by Partitionw(F,R), where
. E D}.
I
E is an extension of .6. iff there is a default partition sequence (Wo, ... , Wl) such that E is the set of sen tences true in all the worlds in wl.
In the following, let%(¢) denote the weighted propor tion of worlds in which ¢ is true among the worlds in the context (W;, ... , W1).
Theorem 7 Given a threshold collection C = (T, F) and a threshold parameter t, a sequential threshold partition sequence can be constructed by Parti tionw (F, R), where R={(%( ¢)�1-t; ¢}:¢ET}.
ci> == ( ¢1, ... , ¢1-I) is a filtered sequence of C at t iff there is a sequential threshold partition sequence (Wo, ... , W1/ such that r; = ( % ( ¢;) � 1-E; ¢;) is the rule used at step i. The threshold probability Pr <:
is the weighted proportion of worlds in which 1/J is true in "Wi.
The partition sequences for normal default theories and sequential thresholding sport very similar condi tions. The set of facts used to construct W0 is given by a fact set F in both formalisms. In normal de fault theory, a default rule 0'�1 can be applied when o: is true and "Y is possible in the current context of (W;, ... , Wz). After this rule is applied, we take "Y as true, and exclude all those worlds in which "Y is false when we construct the revised context (W;+l, ... , W1 ).
Similarly in sequential thresholding, ¢; E T is ap pended to the filtered sequence when the proportion of worlds in which ¢; is true among those in the cur rent context (W;, ... , WI) is above threshold. After we have thresholded ¢;,we take¢; to be true, and exclude all those worlds in which ¢; is false when we construct the revised context (WH1, .. . , W!)-For default logic, the last class W1 determines what for mulas are present in that particular extension, while for sequential thresholding, wl represents the formu las we have accepted (the filtered sequence) and the threshold probabilities with respect to these formulas.
SYMBIOSIS
Given the similarities regarding the structures of de fault logic and sequential thresholding, we can com bine them easily into a hybrid formalism that makes use of non-monotonic rules whose applicability condi tions involve both default logic style and probabilistic threshold style components. In this section we discuss how each formalism can benefit from the other in a hybrid arrangement.
6.1
FINDING THE GOOD EXTENSIONS
We saw that unlike many other probabilistic for malisms, sequential thresholding is non-monotonic, in that previously thresholded formulas can enter into subsequent computations as ( defeasibly) true and not just highly probable statements.
The similarity in structure of sequential thresholding and default logic provides a link from "intuition" to probabilistically grounded rules, with respect to the specific context a default rule faces when it is applied during the reasoning process. This can be used to establish a context-sensitive metric for evaluating the relative "goodness" of multiple extensions, a situation often encountered in default logic.
An extension is constructed from a default theory � = {D, F) by starting with the set of facts F, and applying a sequence of default rules (d1, ... , d1_1) successively.
Let each default rule be normal and of the form d; = a:;:�'"fi. The same partition sequence corresponding to this default extension can be achieved by sequential thresholding, using F as the fact set and { -y1 , ... , 11-1} as the filtered sequence, with respect to some € large enough so that all the 1's can be above threshold.
There can be various ways to defi ne a goodness mea sure of an extension as a function of this t: value. For example, one way is to take the minimum value fmin that would yield the extension in question. The se quential threshold 1 -Emin measures how probable the most improbable (in the sequential context) default consequent is among those of the default rules used in constructing the particular extension. We can consider an extension "better" than another if its associated minimum threshold parameter Emin is smaller.
In contrast to other works relating default logic to probability, such as [Pearl, 1989; Neufeld et al., 1990; Goldszmidt et al., 1990; Bacchus et al., 1993] , sequen tial thresholding retains the non-monotonic nature of default logic. This gives a fairer measure of the good ness of an extension, since it obeys a fundamental principle motivating default logic. In particular, both default logic and sequential thresholding rely on the evolving context resulting from the non-monotonic ac ceptance of conclusions.
WHAT'S IN IT FOR THRESHOLDING?
Some may argue the main strength of default logic over probabilistic approaches is that we can avoid having to come up with messy numbers. Why, one would then ask, do we need to have default rules at all when we have the probabilities?
People are not good at assigning numeric values to propositions. This difficulty alone provides a good in centive for seeking out formalisms that either do not make use of numeric information, or if they do, are not sensitive to perturbations in the numbers assigned. Se quential thresholding by itself is very sensitive to the value of the threshold parameter t: [Teng, 1996] , and thus it makes more sense to use it as a companion mechanism for ranking default extensions rather than using it as a standalone reasoning mechanism. We are not as dependent on the actual numbers assigned when we only need to use them as a way to determine the relative goodness of the extensions. Now consider the instantiation a: bird, a' : penguin, b: fly. We know that flying penguins are quite rare, but how rare? The constraints on the magnitude of the weights assigned to the worlds in order to make E2 more favorable than Et is very loose: we just need to make sure that the weight of {a, a' , b} (flying pen guins) is smaller than the weight of {a, a', -,b} (non flying penguins). This will ensure that the minimum e required for s 2 is smaller than that for sl.
It is very obvious in this toy example that the weights of the two worlds in question should differ greatly.
However, in more complicated situations, we may only have a vague idea of the distribution of weights, and it would be helpful to know that there can be some leeway in the specification.
CONCLUSION
In non-monotonic reasoning, we accept certain conclu sions as true although we do not know for sure that they are. All subsequent reasoning is carried out with the assumption that these accepted conclusions are in deed true. We argued that the problem of choosing be tween multiple extensions in default logic is due to the lack of contextual information. The evolving context during the course of the reasoning process is important in determining the "intuition" behind a default rule. We stress here that the rules are not modular, in the sense that they are not intended to be specified in a way that makes them independent of the rest of the rules and facts. On the contrary, the applicability con dition cond of a rule depends critically on the current context, which is an environment created by the facts and the use of other rules. A more rigorous formaliza tio n of the generic non-monotonic partition sequences and further discussion can be found in [Teng, 1997) .
